We analyze monthly returns on an equally weighted index of eighteen to twenty-three equity (real property) real estate investment trusts (REITs) that were traded on major stock exchanges over the 1973-87 period. We employ a multifactor Arbitrage Pricing Model using prespecified macroeconomic factors. We also test whether equity REIT returns are related to changes in the discount on closed-end stock funds, which seems plausible given the closed-end nature of REITs.
Early research on real estate returns concluded, somewhat tentatively, that real estate both earned substantial risk-adjusted excess returns and served as a good hedge against inflation [Brueggeman, Chen and Thibodeau (1984) , Ibbotson and Siegel (1984) and Hartzell, Heckman and Miles (1987) 1.
Unfortunately, these studies employed return data based on market appraisals, rather than actual transaction prices. Such data are now widely recognized as being smoothed, which understates the true volatility of real estate returns and overstates the risk-adjusted returns (Firstenberg, Ross and Zisler, 1988, and Geltner, l989) .l Rather than focus on appraisal-based returns, we analyze monthly returns on equity (real property) real estate investment trusts (REITs) that are traded on major stock exchanges. While our series might overstate the volatility of real estate returns owing to the closed-end nature of the REITs (Firstenberg, Ross and Zisler, 1988) , these returns are certainly more representative of transaction prices than those based on appraised values. In assessing the relative riskiness of real estate returns, we employ a multifactor Arbitrage Pricing Model as well as the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Because we wish to uncover how various macroeconomic factors, including inflation, affect real estate returns, we use the factors prespecified in Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) , rather than the factor analytic approach of Titman and Warga (1987) . Because we are interested in the relative riskiness of real estate, we explain equallyweighted market indexes for both equity REITs and NYSE firms.
Our results illustrate the importance of using a multifactor model. When a simple CAPM framework is employed, we find evidence of excess real estate returns, especially in the 1980s. However, when the multifactor model is employed, this evidence evaporates. Three factors consistently drive both real estate and stock market returns: changes in the risk and term structures and unexpected inflation. Because unexpected inflation has a negative impact, real estate is not a hedge againstunexpected inflation. The impact of changes in expected inflation is not stable over time, tending to be negative in the l97Oa and positive in the 1980s, while the impact of forward changes in industrial production is positive but estimated imprecisely. Except for the latter variable, the impacts of the macro factors on real estate returns are consistently around 60 percent of the impacts on corporate atock returna generally.
We also explore the possibility that the same forces driving discounts on closed-end stock funds affect returns on equity REITa. Because equity REITs are closed-end mutual funds invested in real-estate assets (largely real properties), such a relationship seems plausible and is, in fact, uncovered in the data. When our equally-weighted equity REIT return index is regressed on the closed-end stock-fund discount computed by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1989) , a coefficient of 0.5 is obtained with a t-ratio of three, further reinforcing the result that real estate is less risky than common stocks.
The paper is divided into three sections and a conclusion. Section I derives the basic estimation equation, Section II discusses the equity REIT data and their determinants, and Section III reports the empirical results.
I. The Estimation Methodoloey
A useful empirical framework for evaluating REIT risk-adjusted performance in a multifactor world requires regressing REIT excess returns on the excess returns of portfolios whose returns mimic (are perfectly correlated with) the individual prespecified factors. This approach is similar to the performance evaluation technique of Connor and Korajczyk (1986) and Titman and Warga (1988) using factors estimated from stock return data. The mimicking portfolios we use are those derived by Huberinan, Kandel and Stambaugh (1986) . The model subsection below derives the pricing relation. The second subsection then explains how these mimicking portfolios are formed and their returns calculated.
A. The Model
In the Arbitrage Pricing Model of Ross (1976) , returns on N assets in the economy are assumed to be generated by the following factor model: r-E+Bf+€, (1) where r is a Nxl vector of returns, E is a Nxl vector of expected returns, f is a Kxl matrix of random factors with means equal to zero, B is a NxK matrix of factor sensitivities (loadings), and is an Nxl vector of residuals. The covariance matrix of r is given by V, and the covariance matrix of the e is given by Z. If exact pricing condition obtains,2
E_irf+Bu (2) where rf is the return on a riskless asset if it exists, i is a vector of ones, and u is a Kxl vector of risk premiums associated with each of the factors. Thus
The factors f are not identified by the APT. Following Chen, Roll and Ross (CRR, 1986) and Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) , we prespecify them to be a set of macroeconomic innovations that capture the pervasive forces in the economy. Regressing the time series of returns in excess of the T-bill rate on these macroeconomic innovations and a constant can help us determine the sensitivities, B, but the risk premiums, u, are imbedded in the constant.
Thus, the intercept of the time series regression cannot be interpreted aa a
Jensen performance measure, as in the Capital Asset Pricing Model. We can,
however, obtain a Jensen performance measure if we state the pricing relation in terms of a set of mimicking portfolios.
Portfolios are known as mimicking portfolios if their payoffs, rather than the random factors, can be used for pricing the N assets when exact arbitrage pricing holds. Let ak be a Nxl vector that represents positions in the N assets that mimic the k-th factor, i.e. , the return on this portfolio moves one-for-one with movements in the k-th factor and is unrelated to movements in the other factors. The Kxl vector of payoffs on the K mimicking positions is given as R -A'r, where A is a NxK matrix whoae k-th column is aSK. That is, when the expected returns on the N assets can be stated in terms of return sensitivities to these mimicking portfolios:
where C -Cov(r,R) -VA and v is a vector of constants. Huberman, Kandel and Stambaugh (1986) show that there are numerous sets of mimicking portfolios for a given set of factors. One particular set of mimicking portfolios that is convenient for our tests is given by
These portfolios have the minimum residual variance of all the possible mimicking portfolios, subject to the condition that akB -ek where ek is a Kxl vector with the k-th component equal to one and other components equal to zero. Note that the returns to the mimicking portfolios, R -Ar, are equivalent to generalized least squares cross sectional regression coefficients of the asset returns on the sensitivity coefficients (Grinblatt and Titnian, 1987) .
Two properties of these "unit loading" mimicking portfolios are noteworthy (the proofs are given in Huberman, Kandel and Stanbaugh). First, the loadings of all assets with respect to these mimicking portfolios are equal to B, which are the loadings with respect to the original factors.
r-a+BR+,
where a and , are both Nxl vectors, 'i containing random residuals with mean zero. Taking the expectation of (5) 
B. Formation of Mimicking Portfolios
Five macroeconomic variables are pre-specified to be the factors that affect returns in interval t. These are identical to the ones used by CRR:
(I) industrial production growth from t to t+l; (2) the change in expected inflation from t-l to t: (3) unexpected inflation in t; (4) the difference between the returns on low grade corporate bonds (below BAA) and long-term Treasury bonds in period t (the change in the risk structure); and (5) the difference between the returns between the long-term Treasury bonds and the one month T-bill rate in period t (the change in the term structure). The bill rate, inflation rate and Treasury bond return data are all from Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1987) . The manufacturing industrial production index is from the Citibase Data Base, and the low grade corporate bond return was supplied by Ibbotaon. Expected inflation ia estimated by an univariate autoregressive procedure with aix lags.
The assets from which we form the mimicking portfolios are twenty 
II. The Data
Our total REIT sample consists of 30 equity REIT5 traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NSDAQ for various parts of the 1973-87 period. To be included in our sample, we had to have share data over a variety of economic environments (upswings and downturns, changing inflation) and the REIT had to be invested predominately (over 75 percent) in (unforeclosed) real estate properties during these periods.3 This effectively requires that the REIT must have existed before 1982 and have lasted over four years. Because we have excluded some short-lived REITs that subsequently declared bankruptcy, some upward bias exists in our sample.
The 30 equity REITs, the period over which they are in our sample (pre-1973 data were not used), the stock exchanges on which they were listed, and whether they are highly (14 REITs) or moderately (16 REITs) levered are shown in Table 1 . Highly levered firms are those with at least 60 percent book debt-to-asset ratios and 40 percent book net debt (debt less financial assets) to asset ratios.4 The sample contains seven "1970s" REITs that are not in our data base after 1982; seven "l980s" REITs that are not in our data base prior to 1978, and sixteen 70s/80s REITs. At least 18 equity
REITs are in our sample throughout our estimation period, except the first three months of 1973 when only 15 are in the sample. and with lower standard deviations. This was also true, but to a lesser extent, for NYSE stocks generally.
For comparison, Figure 1 plots quarterly values of our equally-weighted REIT series against the value-weighted equity REIT series published by the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (1989, p. 55) . While the series are obviously correlated, our series is more volatile in the l970s. Figure 2 plots quarterly returns on our two REIT subclasses. As can be seen, returns on the more levered REITs are more volatile than those on the less levered REITs, as one would expect.
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the macroeconomic factors (correlations for the mimicking portfolios are given in parentheses)
are listed in Table 3 . Unexpected inflation was generally positive in the 1970s, when actual inflation was accelerating, and negative in the l980s, when actual inflation was decelerating. The mean values of industrial production growth (nearly 3 percent per year), the change in expected inflation (zero), and the risk structure variable are roughly the same in the 1970s and l980s. In contrast, the term structure variable tends to be negative in the l970s, when bond rates were generally rising, and positive in the 1980s, when bond rates were generally falling.
The correlation matrix reveals two large correlations, especially in the mimicking portfolios. First, the change in expected inflation and unexpected inflation have a correlation coefficient of 0.53 (0.77 for the mimicking portfolios). The positive correlation arises because unexpected inflation leads to an upward revision in expected inflation. Second, the risk and term structure variables are strongly negatively correlated (-0.65 for the factors and -0.76 for the mimicking portfolios. The negative correlation should not be a surprise given that the expost return on Treasury bonds is subtracted in the change-in-risk structure variable and is added in the change-in-term structure variable.6
III. EmDirical Results
Our empirical results are divided into three parts. In the first, we relate real estate returns net of the bill rate to the underlying macroeconomic factors and the mimicking portfolios (we estimate equations 1' and 6). Both a single factor model (returns on equally-or value-weighted NYSE indexes) and the five factor model of CRR are tested. In the second part, we test for leverage effects by explaining component equity REIT indexes where the REITs have been subdivided by degree of leverage. In the third part, we explore the relationship between equity REIT returns and changes in the discount on an index of closed-end stock funds.
A. Factors and Returns With a monthly a of 0.005, the point estimate of the annual excess return is a startling 6 percent. These regressions also indicate that our equallyweighted equity REIT return series is more closely related (higher 2) to an equally-weighted NYSE return index than to a value-weighted index, a not surprising result. In what follows, both our equally-weighted REIT series and the equally-weighted NYSE return series will be explained with the five factors. Table 5 Three events are bad for stocks, including REIT5: unexpected inflation, an increase in long-term interest rates, and an increase in low grade rates relative to higher grade rates (an increase in bankruptcy risk).
These events occur at various, and variable, points in the business cycle.
What is important about our results is that equity REIT returns are significantly less sensitive (only about 60 percent as much) to these bad events as are stock returns generally. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that real estate is less risky than common stocks.
In all cases, for both the REIT and NYSE indexes, coefficients on the risk and term return variables are within a standard error of each other, which suggests that REIT and general stock market returns responded solely to returns on low-grade bonds (the positive response to the high grade bond return implicit in the term structure variable is cancelled by the negative response implicit in the risk structure variable). NYSE returns move slightly more (30 percent) than one-for-one with low-grade bond returns;
REIT returns move somewhat less (20 percent).
The impacts of changes in expected inflation and industrial production are far less clear.8 Both REIT and NYSE indexes are significantly positively related to changes in expected inflation in the l980s, but unrelated (with negative coefficients) in the l970s. Both return series appear to be positively related to industrial production, with most of the impact for equity REITS coming from the 1970s. However, none of the coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. Given the mixed results here, we would be inclined to doubt the importance of these two factors.
The factors explain only half as much of the movement in equity REIT returns as in the NYSE index (k2 of 0.17 versus 0.35). The greater unexplained variation in REIT returns probably reflects two factors: the greater unique risk in REITs (on average, there are about 20 REITs in the sample versus over a 1000 NYSE fins) and variation in the implicit discounts of the closed-end REITs. Unexpected inflation and the risk and ten structure returns work as before, although the risk structure coefficients are about a fifth less and the ten structure coefficients a third less. Changes in expected inflation and industrial production now have more consistent positive coefficients.
Most important are the constant tens, which can now be interpreted as evidence of positive or negative risk-adjusted excess returns. As can be seen, there is no evidence of excess returns on REITs, in contrast to the single factor results reported in Table 4 .
B. Returns on REITs with Varying Leverage
As we noted early, most of the equity REITs in our sample are substantially levered (have book debt to asset ratios above 0.6). Why REITs are levered is uncertain. The usual optimal leverage point is that at which the tax advantage of debt equals agency and bankruptcy costs, but equity REITs are not subject to taxation. For equity REITs, nontax advantages must exist. What these advantages are could well affect how returns on differentially levered firms respond to the macroeconomic factors.
Two possible advantages to long-term debt come to mind. First, if the underlying properties have nonvsriable long-term leases, long-term debt will act to balance the risk associated with such leases in a volatile world.
Second, if equity REIT investors sre largely institutions with legal restrictions against leverage, the REITs can lever for the institutions.
The second advantage will simply increase risk for the usual reasons.9 In this case we would expect returns on highly levered equity REITs to be more sensitive to all macroeconomic factors than returns on less heavily levered equity REITs.
The results where the REITs are partitioned into highly levered (14 REITs) and moderately levered (16 REITs) are given in Table 7 . The highly levered REITs are consistently more strongly related to the three factors most important to REIT returns (the risk and term structure variables and unexpected inflation) than are the moderately levered REITs. This suggests that REITs are not using leverage to hedge fixed-rate long-term leases.
There is no evidence of excess returns for either REIT category in either the 1970s or the 1980s.10
C. REITs and Closed-End Stock Funds Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1989) have computed value-weighted discounts on closed-end stock and bond funds and provided evidence that the discounts are high when investors (especially in small stocks) are pessimistic and low when investors are optimistic. It is at least plausible that the same forces causing changes in the LST discounts cause changes in equity REIT discounts and thus in equity REIT returns.
LST computed discounts for 20 stock funds and 30 bond funds. However, discount data for only 7 to 18 stock funds existed in any given month.
Separate weighted-average discount series were obtained for all funds, just stock funds, and just domestic stock funds (American South African and Japan
Fund were excluded).11 Results are reported below using each of these three series.
In the absence of a closed-end fund discount, the value of an equity REIT is simply its net asset value (NAy). With a discount, we write
REIT -NAV
The percentage change (%Es) in REIT value, which is also the REIT return ignoring cash flow, is then
NAy -
Thus REIT/NAV -I + DISC, and its percentage change is simply ADISC/(1+DISC). To determine whether the discount in our equally-weighted equity REIT index is related to any of the LST value-weighted discounts, we regress the our equity REIT return on this variable. As can be seen, the equity REIT discount seems to move by about one-half the movement in any of the LST discounts.
To determine whether the LST discount is an independent force or is simply picking up the impact of macroeconomic factors, we reestimated the first equation in Table S over the 1973-85 period with the domestic stock fund discount variable. The latter has a coefficient of 0.404 with a tratio of 2.6, while the coefficients on the macro factors are similar to those in Table S . That is, the discount does hsve an independent effect.
REIT returns are also regressed on the discount variable and the mimicking portfolios. Here the discount's coefficient is only 0.10 with s t-ratio of 0.8. That is, the discount is dominated by the mimicking portfolios but not by the macrofactors themselves: This is because the mimicking portfolios are size ranked and, as Lee, Shleifer and Thaler have shown, the discount is correlated with returns on size-ranked portfolios.
Last, we regressed our highly-levered and moderately-levered REIT indexes on the percentage change in the LST closed-end stock fund discount. As expected discounts on more highly levered REITs are more sensitive to the LST closed-end stock fund discount than are discounts on less highly levered REITs.
IV. Conclusion
Early research on real estate returns concluded that real estate both earned substantial risk-adjusted excess returns and served as a good hedge against inflation. This research employed appraisal-based real estate return data. When transactions-based equity REIT returns (an equallyweighted series for 18 to 23 REITs) are utilized in a single factor CAPM model, excess returns still seen to exist, at least in the 1980s. However, when a five factor model is used, the evidence of excess returns disappears.
Moreover, real estate is not seen to be a hedge against inflation.
The five factors employed are changes in expected inflation and industrial production, the risk and term structure return variables, and unexpected inflation. The latter three factors consistently affect both real estate and general stock market returns in the 1970s and 1980s.
Returns are positively related to the risk and tern structure returns and negatively related to unexpected inflation. Moreover, real estate returns are affected only about 60 percent as much as NYSE returns generally. That is, real estate is less risky than common stocks. Changes in expected inflation and industrial production do not have systematic impacts, although that of industrial production does seem to be positive.
We also divide our equity REITs into highly and moderately levered subgroups and compute equally-weighted return series. Regressions of these series on the five macroeconomic factors indicate that the more levered REITs are consistently more strongly related to the factors than are the less levered REITs. Again, no evidence of excess returns appears.
Last, we relate equity REIT returns to the percentage change in the discount on closed-end stock funds. A statistically significant relation is estimated, with the implied closed-end fund discount on equity REITs changing by about half of any change in the closed-end stock fund discount.
Regressions of REIT returns on the discount variable and the macroeconomic factors suggest that the discount variable is not simply proxying for the macroeconomic factors but has an independent influence.
We see three useful directions in which to extend this research. First, the effect of leverage should be studied in more depth. Varying leverage of REITs over time and the proportion of assets with long-term fixed rate leases (nonresidential properties versus residential properties) should be accounted for in this extension. Second, the same model can be applied to various classes of mortgage REITs. These REITs vary widely in risk with construction-loan REITs probably being the riskiest and GNMA REITs being the least. Third, the performance of equity REITs could usefully be compared more closely with that of closed-end mutual funds, as was done in the original equity REIT study (Smith and Shulman, 1976 4The book values refer to data around 1980-82, the middle of our estimation period.
5Mesns (and standard deviations) for their quarterly data are 3.66 (7.88)
for 1973-87, 3.04 (9.03) for 1973-79, and 4.21 (6.83) for 1980-87. The same data for our equally-weighted series are 4. 45 (9.77) for 1973-87, 3.73 (12.50) for 1973-79, and 5.10 (6.68) for 1980-87. 6This reasoning is a bit too mechanistic. If changes in new-issue Treasury coupon rates affected returns on Treasuries and junk bonds equally, the changes in the risk and term structure variables would not be correlated.
Junk bond returns would be affected differentially (less) to the extent that they have a shorter duration and are callable.
7These results are consistent with Liu, Hartzell, Grissom and Greig (1990) who find that six of their 18 equity REITs earned excess returns in the 1978-86 period.
8Note that the expected inflation variable employed is the change in expected inflation, not the level. Because the level is known at the beginning of the month, it is not an economic surprise. The studies referred to in our opening paragraph generally related real estate returns to the level of expected inflation, not the change.
9Some of the debt could be below-market mortgages assumed when properties were purchased. It would seem unlikely that most of the debt arises in this way, and if the debt were really onerous except for its low interest rate, then the REIT would likely induce the lender to accept retirement of the debt at below par. In any event, such debt increases the risk of equity returns.
'°When the moderately leveraged REITs are further subdivided into medium and lightly leveraged (8 each), leaving as few as five REITs in the sample at times, there is some evidence of excess returns for the medium group in the l980s.
11We thank Charles Lee for supplying us with the data. 1.89* (.0027) (.0525 Standard errors of regression coefficients are in parentheses.
*Indicates significant t ratio at 5 percent level for one-tailed test. 
